

CIAOCl      SNSEE 750523  
Soviet Union, Eastern Europe


Approved For Release 2000/09/14 : CIA-RDP86T00800R000400080050-6

23 May 75

S/NFD      1 of 1  
No. 0100/75

**Secret**

*No Foreign Dissem*



## STAFF NOTES:

# Soviet Union Eastern Europe

**Secret**

162

May 23, 1975  
No. 0100/75

**Warning Notice  
Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved**

**NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION  
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions**

Classified by 005827  
Exempt from general declassification schedule  
of E. O. 11652, exemption category:  
§ 5B (1), (2), and (3)  
Automatically declassified  
on: Date Impossible to Determine

## **SOVIET UNION - EASTERN EUROPE**

This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington community by the USSR - Eastern Europe Division, Office of Current Intelligence, with occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should be directed to the authors of the individual articles.

### **CONTENTS**

**May 23, 1975**

Soviet Nonconformists Back Down. . . . .	1
Amalryk Returns to Moscow. . . . .	3
Husak To Become President of Czechoslovakia. . . . .	4
European Communist Conference Maneuvers. . . .	5

REF ID: A86T00608R000400080050-6

Soviet Nonconformists Back Down

Soviet nonconformist artists, whom the regime has recently seemed to ignore as it cracked down on more politicized dissent, are now receiving the same rough treatment and are fearful that their situation will turn from bad to worse. In view of KGB harassment and threats directed at Moscow's unconventional artists over the past week, as well as reports of the same harsh action inflicted on their Leningrad colleagues, artists in both cities have decided to "postpone" the joint open air art show planned for this weekend in Leningrad (*Staff Notes*, May 20).

25X1C

[REDACTED]

told the US embassy that the nonconformists are making formal complaints to the cultural bureaucracy about their treatment, but that subsequently they plan to "keep quiet" and try to regroup.

The artists now feel that the regime's leniency which had permitted them to hold a series of private shows in Moscow was a tactical move to flush out the nonconformists. They also view the Moscow party daily's May 17 attack on them as a clear sign of tougher times to come. Although the article does not appear to be a comprehensive statement of regime policy, its blast at nonconformist art from strictly doctrinaire ideological positions indicates that the regime does not intend to let unorthodoxy gain a foothold even while long-term cultural policy marks time.

25X1C

[REDACTED] some other prominent members of the group are so discouraged about their immediate prospects that they plan to apply for emigration.

May 23, 1975

REF ID: A86T00608R000400080050-6

This could be one of the goals of the regime's harassment. Security officials and ideological watchdogs may be hoping that the departure of some of the major names in the "movement" will rob it of its leadership. Still intransigent lesser lights could then be subjected to sanctions without generating large amounts of critical publicity in the West. (CONFIDENTIAL)

25X1A

[REDACTED]  
Phone: 143-7453

May 23, 1975

Amalryk Returns to Moscow

Disident Soviet writer Andrey Amalryk, now in Moscow after being released earlier this month from exile in Siberia, hopes to travel abroad "temporarily," but Soviet officials may force him to emigrate permanently if he is allowed to leave at all. Amalryk is aware of the recently reiterated invitations from Harvard and George Washington to spend an academic year in the US, and may be hoping that this will help him to gain official approval for his travel plans.

Amalryk is best known in the West for his essay *Will the Soviet Union Survive Until 1984?*, which combines a skeptical analysis of the prospects for democratization in the USSR with speculation on an apocalyptic disintegration of the Soviet state during a protracted war with China. He is also author of *Involuntary Journey to Siberia*, an account of his initial exile from Moscow as a "social parasite" in 1965. Amalryk's latest stint included three years in a labor camp, which he marked with hunger strikes, and a subsequent two years in exile near Magadan on the Pacific coast.

For the moment, Amalryk seems cautious; he says he does not wish to have contacts with foreigners for a while. Amalryk's friends say, however, that he seems uncharacteristically naive about the situation in Moscow and too optimistic about his longer term prospects. He has so far received no indication from the authorities to justify his hopes that he will be able to travel abroad on a Soviet passport and return home. Indeed, his statement that he had refused an official offer to emigrate to Israel proffered while he was at Magadan suggests that he faces either more hard times at home or permanent expulsion. (CONFIDENTIAL)

25X1A

Phone: 143-7453

May 23, 1975

**SECRET**

Approved For Release 2000/09/14 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000400080050-6

Husak To Become President of Czechoslovakia

Party chief Gustav Husak will probably be named president next week. He will almost certainly continue as the party's top leader.

25X1C [REDACTED]

claim that the party central committee will meet on Tuesday and that a special session of parliament will follow on Wednesday. These tandem events strongly suggest that the regime has finally decided to retire General Ludvik Svoboda, the aged and ailing president.

Premier Strougal, who has for more than a year fulfilled all the official duties of the 79-year old Svoboda, recently told the Austrian foreign minister that the presidential succession question would be settled by June 1 (*Staff Notes*, May 15).

The change in presidents does not portend any change either in Czechoslovak policy toward the US or in Prague's subservience to Moscow. As president, Husak would have expanded contacts with visiting foreign dignitaries, particularly from the West. He may also do more traveling in the West in an effort to refurbish Czechoslovakia's tarnished image.

Husak's decision to hold the country's top party and state posts concurrently will not break any Czechoslovak precedents. [REDACTED] 25X1C that he will wear the two top hats only until the party congress next spring. This arrangement could lead to jockeying for position by those who see themselves in line for Husak's party mantle.  
(**SECRET**)

25X1A  
[REDACTED]

Phone: 143-7441

May 23, 1975

European Communist Conference Maneuvers

The road to the European Communist conference is not proving an easy one for the Soviets. At stake is the final document that will be issued by the Communist meeting, to be convened sometime after the European security conference. The Soviets and their allies want a reasonably detailed, programmatic document that will commit the Communist parties in Europe to Moscow's view of the future development of Europe and the Communist movement.

The Soviets do not stand a chance of getting the Yugoslav party, for one, to buy this, and Moscow knows it. But they want to get as many parties as possible to participate in the process. Their problem is how far to push for concessions from the Yugoslavs, the Italians, and the others without forcing a break.

The small tactical victory recently scored by the Yugoslavs and the other parties in drafting the final document was achieved because Moscow is not ready to force a break at this juncture. The question is still open, however, whether Moscow will continue to bend to get a Yugoslav signature on a concluding document in East Berlin next fall or winter.

The tactical interplay so far has been complex. At the second meeting of the working group responsible for drafting the document, held in East Berlin in mid-April, a group of parties, including the Yugoslav, Romanian, Italian, and Spanish, rejected an East German preliminary draft because it did not represent the views of all parties and thereby went against the principle of consensus.

May 23, 1975

SECRET

that had been agreed upon earlier. These parties offered to submit a preliminary draft of their own, but the East Germans proposed that a working group subcommittee draft a revised version based on the East German original that took into account the written and oral comments of the other parties.

This proposal was unacceptable to the Yugoslavs, who inspired reports in late April that they would not take part in the conference. At the same time, Yugoslav party secretary Dolanc issued a tough statement that reiterated positions his party took in East Berlin and implied there would be no compromise. Once it was clear that the Yugoslavs would not take part in the working group subcommittee meetings, the East Germans issued a placatory statement in early May, denying that preparations for the conference had broken down and pointing out that a final document would emerge that gave equal weight to the East German preliminary draft and the proposals of the other parties. The East Germans stressed that their aim was to produce a document acceptable to all and that there was no intention of directing any party how to conduct its own business.

A compromise apparently was reached at the May 12 subcommittee meeting, when the East Germans agreed to withdraw their draft altogether. At the same time, a Yugoslav document was submitted, probably by the Italians. The East Germans promised to use this and other submissions to come up with a new draft for a discussion next month in which the Yugoslavs will participate.

It was the news of this development that probably prompted the highly publicized meeting of Tito, Dolanc, and Glickov in Belgrade on May 13 and Glickov's subsequent trip to Moscow to meet

May 23, 1975

SECRET

with Soviet party secretaries Ponomarev and Katushev. Grlickov evidently tried to extract a promise that the withdrawal of the East German draft meant that Moscow would no longer push for this kind of conference document. Not surprisingly, Ponomarev and Katushev would make no such promise. The Yugoslavs will have to wait for the new East German draft next month to see whether their tactical victory is translated into an acceptable conference statement.  
**(CONFIDENTIAL)**

25X1A  
[REDACTED]

Phone: 143-7285

May 23, 1975